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· Recent Developments 
Nissen Corp. v. Miller: MARYLAND 
REJECTS THE CONTINUITY OF 
ENTERPRISE THEORY IN DE-
TERMINING PRODUCTS LI-
ABILITY OF SUCCESSOR COR-
PORATIONS. 
In Nissen Corp. v. Miller, 594 
A.2d 564 (Md. 1991), the Court of 
Appeals of Maryland adopted the gen-
eral rule of non-liability of successor 
corporations, with its four traditional 
exceptions. In reaching its decision, 
the court considered and expressly 
rejected adding as a fifth exception, 
the" continuity of enterprise" theory. 
The court held that a corporation which 
acquires all or part of the assets of 
another corporation does not acquire 
the liabilities and debts of the prede-
cessor, unless the transaction comes 
within one of the four well-recognized 
exceptions. With the court's decision, 
Maryland joined the majority of states 
adhering to the traditional rule of non-
liability of successor corporations and 
its four exceptions. 
In January of 1981, Frederick B. 
Brandt purchased a treadmill which 
was designed, manufactured and mar-
keted by American Tredex Corpora-
tion ("Tredex"). In July of the same 
year, Tredex sold its assets, including 
inventory, patents and trademarks, 
for an undisclosed sum to the Nissen 
Corporation ("Nissen"). Nissen ex-
pressly agreed not to assume any li-
ability for injuries arising from any 
products previously sold by Tredex. 
As contemplated in the asset purchase 
agreem~nt, Tredex continued to oper-
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ate under a new name, AT Corpora-
tion, for over five years until terminat-
ing operations in December of 1987. 
In October of 1986, Brandt in-
jured himself on the treadmill. One 
year and eleven months later, Brandt 
and his wife filed suit against Nissen 
claiming negligence, strict liability, 
breach of implied and express warran-
ties, and loss of consortium. The trial 
court granted Nissen' s motion for sum-
mary judgment. Brandt appealed and 
the court of special appeals reversed 
the trial court. The Court of Appeals 
of Maryland granted certiorari to con-
sider whether Nissen, as a successor 
to American Tredex, was liable to 
Brandt for his injuries. Nissen, 594 
A.2d at 565. 
The court of appeals first consid-
ered whether to adopt the general rule 
of non-liability of successor corpora-
tions, with its four well-recognized 
exceptions, and if so, whether it should 
add a fifth exception for the " continu-
ity of enterprise." [d. The general 
rule, as stated in the court's opinion, 
provided that a successor corporation 
did not acquire the liabilities and debts 
of the predecessor, unless (1) there 
existed an express or implied agree-
ment to assume liabilities, (2) the 
corporations had in effect merged or 
consolidated as a result of the transac-
tion, (3) the successor corporation 
was a "mere continuation" of the 
previous corporation, or (4) the trans-
action was fraudulent, lacked good 
faith or lacked adequate consideration. 
[d. at 565-66 (citing American Law of 
Products Liability 3d § 7: 1, at 10-12 
(Travers, rev. ed. 1990». 
The court of appeals then reviewed 
Maryland case law and found that the 
general rule and the four exceptions 
had been accepted by the courts both 
in logic and in theory. Nissen, 594 
A.2d at 566. In fact, the first, second 
and fourth exceptions had been ex-
pressly codified in the Maryland An-
notated Code. [d. The third excep-
tion, known as the "mere continua-
tion" or" continuity of entity" theory, 
although never formally adopted or 
codified, had been discussed and ac-
cepted in the dicta of the lower courts. 
[d. (citing Baltimore Luggage v. 
Holtzman, 562 A.2d 1286, 1293 (Md. 
Ct. Spec. App. 1989». 
The only issue before the court, 
therefore, was whether a fifth excep-
tion, the " continuity of enterprise" 
theory, should be adopted. Nissen, 
594 A.2d at 566. The continuity of 
enterprise theory, adopted by a minor-
ity of states, focused on the continua-
tion of a business operation or enter-
prise where there was no continuation 
of ownership. [d. at 567. The excep-
tion was based on the theory that, 
irrespective of fault, a party was ac-
countable for the acts of another. [d. 
Distinguishing this more "liberal" 
exception from the "mere continua-
tion" exception, the court stated that 
the " gravamen of the traditional ex-
ception is the continuation of the cor-
porate entity rather than continuation 
of the business operation." [d. (em-
phasis in original). 
Brandt argued that public policy 
demanded that major corporations 
should not be permitted " to purchase 
only the benefits in an asset purchase 
transaction, while denying its atten-
dant liabilities to the consuming pub-
lic." Id. Nissen countered that the 
asset purchase agreement was a valid 
and fully negotiated contract in which 
the burden of liability for injuries 
caused by defective products had been 
expressly allocated to the predecessor 
corporation. Id. Nissen urged the 
court to adopt the general rule with 
only the four traditional exceptions, 
because the rule balanced the " rights 
of creditors and successor corpora-
tions," as well as "maintain[ed] ad-
equate protection for the interests of 
consumers . . . from fraudulent and 
unjust corporate transactions." Id. at 
568. 
Before reaching its decision, the 
court of appeals considered the doc-
trine of strict liability and its concept 
offault. Id. The court acknowledged 
that public policy concerns for shift-
ing the financial risk of loss to those 
better able to bear it was a policy 
consideration in adopting the doctrine 
into Maryland law. Id. at 569 (citing 
Phipps v. General Motors Corp., 363 
A.2d 955, 963 (Md. 1976)). The 
court, however, emphasized that the 
thrust of strict liability actions was 
that the sellers of products were at 
fault when they put a defective or 
unreasonably dangerous product on 
the market and a user was injured. Id. 
at 569. The court found that a corpo-
rate successor" [was] not a seller," 
and therefore, not involved in " bring-
ing the product and the user together. " 
Id. In addressing the present case, the 
court stated that it would be " unfair to 
require a party to bear the cost of 
unassumed and uncontemplated prod-
ucts liability claims primarily because 
it [was] still in business and [was] 
perceived as a 'deep pocket. ,,, Id. 
The court lastly reviewed the hold-
ings from a minority of states who 
have adopted the continuity of enter-
prise theory. Id. at 571-73. In analyz-
ing these cases, the court failed to find 
a compelling reason to deviate from 
the traditional corporate successor li-
ability rule. Id. at 573. The court 
concluded that the adoption of the 
continuity of enterprise theory would 
be inconsistent with Maryland law, 
because it would require the court to 
abandon its fundamental principle that 
there must be fault to impose tort 
liability. Id. at 574. Thus, the court 
of appeals expressly rejected the con-
tinuity of enterprise theory. Because 
Brandt's claim rested solely upon the 
court's adopting that theory as a fifth 
exception, the court affirmed the trial 
court's decision granting Nissen's 
motion for summary judgment. Id. 
In Nissen Corp. v. Miller, the 
Court of Appeals of Maryland for-
mally adopted the general rule ofnon-
liability of successor corporations, to-
gether with its four traditional and 
well-recognized exceptions. The rule 
and the four exceptions were found to 
be sufficient to protect both the inter-
ests of the consumer and business in 
products liability cases. With the 
court's decision, Maryland joined the 
majority of states adhering to a tradi-
tional rule of non-liability of succes-
sor corporations with its four excep-
tions. 
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Optic Graphics, Inc. v.Agee: MARY-
LAND COURT DEFINES " TRADE 
SECRET" AND DETERMINES 
WHEN SANCTIONS ARE APPRO-
PRIATEFOR BAD F AITII CLAIM 
UNDER MARYLAND UNIFORM 
TRADE SECRET ACT. 
For the first time ever, an appel-
late court has examined the terms of 
the Maryland Uniform Trade Secret 
Act of 1989. In Optic Graphics, Inc. 
v. Agee, 591 A.2d 578 (Md. Ct. Spec. 
App. 1991), the Court of Special Ap-
peals of Maryland held that Maryland's 
Uniform Trade Secret Act protects a 
broader scope of information as trade 
secrets than the Restatement of Torts. 
The court noted, however, that the 
Restatement should still serve as a 
guide in determining what informa-
tion qualifies as a trade secret. The 
court also upheld the part of Maryl and 's 
Uniform Trade Secret Act providing 
for sanctions against parties who ini-
tiate or maintain a claim in bad faith or 
without reasonable justification, but 
only if the claim was entirely without 
color and imputed egregious behav-
ior. 
Co-defendant Ross Agee worked 
for Optic Graphics ("Optic"), an es-
tablished vinyl looseleaf binder manu-
facturer with a work force of nearly 
375 people and annual revenues of 
$27 million. Agee's responsibilities 
initially included estimating costs re-
lated to printing jobs for which Optic 
intended to bid. Agee's duties re-
quired that he have access to certain 
information which Optic considered 
confidential. As with all of its em-
ployees, the company maintained a 
personnel file on Agee which included 
a confidentiality agreement. 
Agee and his co-defendant, 
Michael Zanella, made efforts over a 
number of years to join resources and 
buy a printing business. In June, 
1989, without Optic's knowledge, 
Agee and Zanella took the opportunity 
to buy a looseleaf bindery business 
and formed what eventually became 
the third and final co-defendant in this 
case, A to Z Looseleaf, Inc. (" A to 
Z"). In order to obtain financing for 
the deal, Agee and Zanella prepared a 
formal business plan including, among 
other things, a marketing strategy. By 
October, 1989, they had secured a 
loan which would lead to the settle-
ment of their new business venture in 
February, 1990. 
Optic first found out about the 
forthcoming A to Z when Agee re-
signed from his position with Optic in 
December, 1989. At this time, A to Z 
had no contracts, assets, customers, 
or raw material orders. On January 
24, 1990, Optic filed suit alleging that 
Agee had misappropriated Optic's 
trade secrets and breached a confiden-
tiality agreement. Specifically, Optic 
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